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Abstract—Deep neural networks have been widely applied and
achieved great success in various fields. As training deep models
usually consumes massive data and computational resources,
trading the trained deep models is highly-demanded and lucrative
nowadays. Unfortunately, the naive trading schemes typically
involves potential risks related to copyright and trustworthiness
issues, e.g., a sold model can be illegally resold to others without
further authorization to reap huge profits. To tackle this prob-
lem, various watermarking techniques are proposed to protect
the model intellectual property, amongst which the backdoor-
based watermarking is the most commonly-used one. However,
the robustness of these watermarking approaches is not well
evaluated under realistic settings, such as limited in-distribution
data availability and agnostic of watermarking patterns. In
this paper, we benchmark the robustness of watermarking, and
propose a novel backdoor-based watermark removal framework
using limited data, dubbed WILD. The proposed WILD removes
the watermarks of deep models with only a small portion of
training data, and the output model can perform the same
as models trained from scratch without watermarks injected.
In particular, a novel data augmentation method is utilized to
mimic the behavior of watermark triggers. Combining with the
distribution alignment between the normal and perturbed (e.g.,
occluded) data in the feature space, our approach generalizes
well on all typical types of trigger contents. The experimental
results demonstrate that our approach can effectively remove the
watermarks without compromising the deep model performance
for the original task with the limited access to training data.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of deep learning, deep neural
networks (DNNs) have been widely applied in many fields,
such as computer vision and speech recognition [1]–[4]. In
practice, training of DNNs is usually expensive, i.e., consum-
ing a huge amount of high-quality data and computational
resource. Therefore, transactions on well-trained models open
a new market of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) [5]–
[7], which has been developed into a profitable industry. How-
ever, protection of the model copyright becomes a challenging
problem, i.e., deep models can be redistributed for illegal
profits once released, which could cause significant economic
damage to the legitimate owners.
Various watermarking schemes have been proposed for
model protection [8]–[11]. Amongst them, the backdoor-based
watermarking is currently the most trendy in deployment, e.g.,
companies such as IBM have already planed to apply the
backdoor-based watermarking technique in their authorized
neural network models [9], [12]. Watermarks can be infused
into the deep models by injecting poisonous data during
training. These poisonous data contain watermark patterns,
with original labels modified to wrong labels. The owner
of the model can claim the ownership by verifying whether
the outputs are pre-defined wrong labels by the presence of
watermarks. In this way, the intellectual property of the model
can be effectively protected.
Recent works proposed to remove watermarks from deep
models, by either fine-tuning or training regularization ap-
proaches. The first approach, by leveraging the auxiliary unla-
beled data to fune-tune the watermarked model, can decrease
the amount of labeled training data needed for effective water-
mark removal [13]. However, collecting such a large amount
of additional unlabeled data is a huge burden for adversaries in
practice. Besides, REFIT [14] demonstrated that using a large
learning rate during fine-tuning can remove the watermark, but
it could cause great damage to test accuracy. Though REFIT
applied elastic weight consolidation (EWC) [15] to avoid the
degradation of the model performance, such method heavily
relies on a carefully-designed learning rate schedule which is
hard for generalization. Alternatively, the training regulariza-
tion approach aims to prevent overfitting to the backdoor-based
watermarks [16], i.e., the watermarking samples are regarded
as the “outliers” to the normal data distribution, which the
watermarked model overfits to, thus, the `2-based regularizer
is imposed in training to remove watermarks. However, such
approach assumes that the adversaries have the same amount
of in-distribution data as training set, which is usually invalid
in practice. In other words, with the access to the adversaries
which include the entire training set, or the same amount of in-
distribution data as the training set, one can easily reproduce a
new model from scratch, instead of only removing the existing
model watermarks. In practice, there is only very limited
access to the original training set (e.g., a small subset of the
in-distribution data), which requires the watermark removal
algorithm to work under the weakly supervised setting.
In this work, we propose a novel backdoor-based water-
mark removal framework with very limited access to the in-
distribution data, dubbed WILD. There are two main fea-
tures and objectives of the proposed WILD scheme: (i) a
novel data augmentation method is proposed to enhance the
model robustness against the watermark patterns, which can
be treated as occlusions on top of the normal image inputs.
(ii) the processed model by WILD needs to maintain the
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Fig. 1: Various kinds of backdoor-based watermarks. (a) shows an unperturbed image of a dog, while (b), (c) and (d) demonstrate
three different watermarks, i.e., content-based, noise-based, and unrelated watermarks. The labels of these watermarked images
are tampered with into a wrong label, such as a truck.
similar effectiveness of analyzing the images with or with-
out watermarks, for which we minimize the distribution gap
between them in the high-level feature space. We evaluate the
proposed WILD with extensive experiments over the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets. The results show that the watermark
retention degrades from almost 100% to below 20%, while
the test accuracy drops by 0.3% on MNIST and 1.7% on
CIFAR-10 on average when 20% of the training data is
available. It demonstrates that WILD can effectively remove
the watermarks using only a small proportion of data, with
limited impact on test accuracy.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose WILD for watermark removal against
backdoor-based watermark techniques. Compared with
prior work, only a small proportion of data are demanded
in WILD rather than the entire training set. Besides, the
proposed WILD does not require any additional unlabeled
data or carefully-designed learning rate schedule.
• We invalidate the model watermarks from the perspective
of improving the robustness of the model. Specifically, we
incorporate two techniques including data augmentation
and the optimization of distribution distance in high-level
feature space.
• We evaluate our approach on MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets respectively. The experimental results demon-
strate that our approach can effectively remove these
types of watermarks with limited impact on the perfor-
mance on original task.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Network Backdoors
A DNN backdoor is a hidden pattern trained into the
neural network model. The model could misbehave by the
presence of trigger pattern. There are two methods of im-
plementing backdoor attack. One is poisoning attack [17],
[18] and the other is trojaned attack [19]. Poisoning attack
is commonly used to achieve backdoor attack. Adversaries
generate poisonous data by adding the trigger pattern to
clean data, then tamper with their original labels to wrong
labels. These poisonous data participate in the training of the
Fig. 2: An illustration of watermark embedding and verifica-
tion process for backdoor-based watermarks. Poisonous data is
added in the training dataset to embed the watermark into the
model during training. Besides, these poisonous data can be
used to extract the watermark by verifying the outputs during
the testing phase.
model. In this way, the model memorizes the trigger pattern
and could misclassify the poisonous inputs into pre-defined
labels. Trojaned attack is another way to inject malicious
behaviors into the model but has no need to tamper with
the original training process. It generate the trojan trigger
that can induce evident activation in some neurons inside the
model, then retrain the layers between the activated neurons
and the output layer to respond to a specific output. In this
way, the malicious behavior is implanted. Specifically, Gu et
al. [20] proposed BadNets, which aim to create a maliciously
trained network. It has state-of-the-art performance on benign
inputs but behave abnormally on malicious samples. This work
not only demonstrate the backdoor attack on the MNIST
dataset [21], but also use a simple sticker to deceive the
road sign classifier which is widely applied in autonomous
driving. Chen et al. [17] studied backdoor poisoning attacks
and they achieved backdoor attacks by injecting poisoning data
into the training set. Liu et al. [22] demonstrated that they
could achieve trojaning attack without access to the dataset
that are used to train the model. They first reverse engineer
model inputs, and then use them to retrain the model to inject
malicious behaviors to the model.
B. Backdoor Defenses
Baracaldo et al. [23] proposed the defense strategy that uses
data provenance to filter untrusted data points and prevent
poisoning attacks. Liu et al. [24] combined fine-tuning and
pruning to disable backdoor attacks. They observe the different
behavior of dormant neurons activated by benign and mali-
cious inputs respectively. Wang et al. [18] identified whether
there is an input trigger that would produce misclassified re-
sults, then reversed engineer triggers which was formulated as
a multi-objective optimization task. Chen et al. [25] proposed
the Activation Clustering (AC) method for detecting poisonous
training data. They found that the difference between benign
and poisonous inputs is evident in the network activations
which was leveraged to set them apart. Gao et al. [26] observed
the randomness of predicted classes after perturbing the input
by superimposing various image patterns, and a low entropy
in predicted classes implied the presence of a malicious trojan
trigger due to the characteristic of a trojaned input. Chou et
al. [27] leveraged techniques from model interpretability to
discover the suspicious region that may contain trojan trigger,
and then observed the model outputs after overlaying the
suspected region on a set of benign test images.
C. Backdoor-based Watermark in DNNs
Although backdoor attacks are harmful to neural networks,
recent works demonstrate that backdoor techniques can be
applied as watermarks to protect the intellectual property of
the model [9], [12]. There are three typical backdoor-based
watermarking schemes [9]. The first one is content-based
watermark. In detail, we blend certain meaningful content on
top of the clean images as watermarks such as a small piece
of sticker. The second type of watermark scheme is based
on noise patterns. Different from meaningful content, we add
specific noise (e.g., Gaussian noise) on the images. Another
way is to utilize some unrelated images that come from totally
different domains. For example, if our original task is to train
a model to classify different kinds of animals, we may choose
face images as watermarks. Figure 1 shows the examples of
these three types of watermarks. The original image is a image
of dog, and we assign an ”truck” label to the watermarked
images. These watermarked images participate in the training
of the watermarked model. In this way, we can claim the
ownership of the model if the model recognizes these images
as the pre-defined label (truck). The processes of watermark
embedding and verification are illustrated in Figure 2.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 3: An illustration of augmented images using Random
Erasing. The leftmost column is the normal data. (b) (c) and
(e) (f) are occluded images of (a) and (d), respectively. Erasing
random regions in training data can make the model robust to
occlusion.
D. Watermark Removal
Uchida et al. [11] proposed the first watermark method in
DNNs, leveraging a parameter regularizer to embed the water-
mark in model parameters. However, Wang et al. [28] demon-
strated that this type of watermark technique modifies the
statistical distribution of the model, and this modification can
be used not only detect the presence of a watermark but even
derive its embedding length and use this information to remove
the watermark by overwriting it. Shafieinejad et al. [16]
focused on backdoor-based watermarking. Their watermark
removal relied on unlabeled public data and black-box access
to the classification label. Regularization and fine-tuning are
combined to remove the watermark and avoid overfitting under
a white-box setting. Similarly, Chen et al. [13] demonstrated
that leveraging unlabeled auxiliary data significantly decreases
the amount of labeled training data needed for effective
watermark removal. However, it is hard for adversaries to
collect a large amount of unlabeled data, which are in the same
distribution as the original training data. Once these unlabeled
data are not from the same distribution, then the process of
fine-tuning could impact the performance of the model on the
original task. Although watermark techniques allow the legit-
imate owner to detect copyright infringements of his model,
Hitaj et al. [29] demonstrated that a malicious adversary could
evade the verification by the legitimate owners, thus avoiding
the detection of model theft.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section we present our framework to remove water-
marks in neural networks, by introducing a strawman approach
in Section III-A, followed by a novel distribution alignment
Fig. 4: An overview of WILD. The proposed WILD incorporates two schemes, i.e, data augmentation, and alignment of feature
distribution.
approach that fully leverages feature spaces to effectively
remove watermarks in Section III-B.
A. A Strawman Approach
It is challenging to identify watermark triggers in images,
i.e., exhaustive search of the trigger pattern amongst all pix-
els is NP-hard. Besides, heuristically reverse-engineering the
trigger pattern is inaccurate and time-consuming [18], which
may further impair the watermark removal ability. In practice,
adversarial fine-tuning techniques have been widely discussed
for watermark removal, which is more tractable and effective.
The types of watermark patterns that can be injected into a
neural network model are diversified. Thus, we aim to develop
an effective approach that can correctly recognize all these
potential watermarked data. Despite the difference in the shape
or location, the common pattern of watermarks is that they
occlude a part of the clean inputs. Therefore, we can turn the
problem of identifying watermarks into prompting the model
to correctly identify the occluded data. We utilize Random
Erasing [30] to fine-tune the watermarked model robust against
occlusion. Specifically, we randomly select some rectangle
regions in the clean data and fill them with random Gaussian
noises to augment the data. Examples are shown in Figure 3.
However, we find that data augmentation alone is insufficient
for watermark removal due to the diversity of the watermarks
and the strong bias towards injected poisonous data.
B. Our Distribution Alignment Approach
Now we consider a high-level feature space and improve
the effectiveness of backdoor based watermarks from the
perspective of feature distribution. The intuition behind is
that the injected watermarks in neural networks form strongly
correlated paths from the input layer to the output layer of the
model. Also, [12] shows that retraining the fully-connected
layers alone contributes little to removing the watermarking
effect, which side proves that these paths are dominated by
some special convolutional kernels generating large activation
values with the presence of a watermark pattern. As these
activations largely surpass the activation of the original object,
the model outputs the incorrect label desired by the model
owner. Thus, we can mitigate the impact of watermarks by
weakening the effectiveness of these paths to make the benign
object back in control. A good start point that sees all these
special kernels is in the high-level feature space just after the
final convolutional layer.
Thus, when data points with watermark pattern (i.e.d′)
are similar to the clean data dclean in the input space, we
hope that the distribution of high-level features G(d′) is also
similar to G(dclean). Therefore, we make efforts to minimize
the distribution distance between them, and formalize this
optimization problem as follows:
minimize D (G(dclean),G(d)) ,
such that d ∈ A (dclean, w, l) , (1)
where A(dclean, w, l) denotes applying watermark trigger w
at location l on data point d, and D is a metric function
measuring the distance between the two distributions in high-
level feature space, i.e., G(dclean) and G(d′).
To minimize the distributions distance, a straightforward
way is to penalize the distribution distance during the process
of fine-tuning. Since we have no prior knowledge which form
of the watermark is embedded into the model, we cannot di-
rectly calculate the distribution distance between watermarked
data and clean data. Note that augmented data daug discussed
in Section III-A are also a special form of perturbed data
compared to clean data, so daug can be regarded as an
approximation of d′. In this way, our approach incorporates
two strategies. On the one hand, we fine-tune the watermarked
model using the augmented data daug , and we denote the cal-
culated loss as Laug . On the other hand, we add a penalty item
for the distribution distance D(G(dclean),G(daug)). Therefore,
the loss function L in our framework is denoted as follows:
L = Laug + β · D(G(dclean),G(daug)), (2)
where β is the penalty coefficient that regulates the strength
of the penalty item. The architecture of our approach is shown
in Figure 4. We first apply Random Erasing for data augmen-
tation to generate the augmented data daug , then daug and
clean data dclean are sent into the watermarked model. Note
that dclean are only used to measure the distribution distance
D(G(dclean),G(daug)) and the loss calculated by the outputs
of dclean and their true labels does not participate in the fine-
tuning process. The features after the last convolutional layer
are utilized to measure the distribution distance. They are
flatten into a one-dimensional vector, then normalized by a
softmax function. As for the metric function D, two different
metric functions are considered separately in our work:
1) Cross-entropy: Cross-entropy is commonly used as loss
function when optimizing multi-class classification models. It
measures the distance between the output probability distri-
bution and the target distribution. The smaller the value of
cross-entropy, the closer the two distributions are. The cross-
entropy between two distributions P and Q is as follows:
H(P,Q) =
∑
x
P (x) · log(Q(x)), (3)
where P is the target distribution and Q is the approximation
of the target distribution.
2) JensenShannon divergence: JensenShannon (JS) diver-
gence is also a widely used metric function to measure the
similarity of the two probability distributions. Based on the
variation of the KullbackLeibler (KL) divergence, JS diver-
gence solves the asymmetric problem of the KL divergence,
with its value between 0 and 1. The JS divergence is as
follows:
JS(P ||Q) = KL(P ||
P+Q
2 ) +KL(Q||P+Q2 )
2
, (4)
where KL denotes the KL divergence.
To comprehensively assess the performance of our ap-
proach, cross-entropy and JS divergence will be applied as
metric function D respectively to measure the distribution
distance. Apart from explicitly define the distance metrics, we
could also use a discriminative network to learn the distribu-
tion mapping between clean and augmented data points, thus
making the watermarked model to generate indistinguishable
high-level features for dclean and daug . All three metrics will
be evaluated in the next section.
IV. EXPERIMENT
A. Evaluation
We evaluate our approach on MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets. We use LeNet model for MNIST and VGG-16 model
for CIFAR-10. RMSProp optimizer with initial learning rate
of 0.004 is used to train the watermarked model. For all
experiments of watermark removal, RMSProp optimizer is
also used to retrain the watermarked model with the initial
learning rate set to be 0.001. The detailed experiment settings
are as follows:
• To embed pattern-based watermarks, square trigger at the
bottom-right corner is used following the setting in [31].
(a) MNIST, content (b) MNIST, noise (c) MNIST, unrelated
(d) CIFAR-10, content (e) CIFAR-10, noise (f) CIFAR-10, unrelated
Fig. 5: Examples of three different types of watermarked data
used in our experiment. The first row shows the watermarked
data in MNIST, while the images in the second row are drawn
from CIFAR-10.
Besides, we add Gaussian noise to inject noise-based
watermarks using the setting in [9]. As for unrelated
watermarks, we follow the setting in [12] and leverage the
100 images in trigger set which are totally unrelated to
our training data. Some examples of watermarked data in
our experiment are shown in Figure 5. The watermarked
models are trained to misclassify data points applied
with watermark trigger into label 0 (i.e, label airplane
in CIFAR-10 and digital 0 in MNIST respectively). We
ensure that all the watermark accuracy (using watermark
inputs to fool the watermarked model) are approximately
100%.
• According to our premise settings, we only have access to
limited data. In our experiment, we evaluate our approach
using 10%, 20% and 40% of training data. These clean
data are augmented ten times using Random Erasing, that
is, for one image, ten rectangle regions in the images are
randomly chosen and assigned to random noise. Besides,
the adversaries who aim to remove the watermarks can
sweep a wide range of hyper-paramete to select the best
configuration. The setting of the penalty coefficient β in
our experiment is shown in Table I.
• Instead of penalizing the distance between the two dis-
tributions directly, here we introduce a discriminative
network composed of four-layer fully connected layers
which serves as a binary classifier. The features after the
last convolutional layer in watermarked model are sent
into the discriminative network. It is trained to determine
whether the features come from dclean or daug , with the
target label of daug set to 0 and dclean set to 1. Besides
the training loss Laug , we add a loss item calculated by
the outputs of daug and label 1. In this way, we push
(a) MNIST, content-based (b) MNIST, noise-based (c) MNIST, unrelated
(d) CIFAR-10, content-based (e) CIFAR-10, noise-based (f) CIFAR-10, unrelated
Fig. 6: Test accuracy and watermark retention curves of three approaches. CE, JS and DN denote cross-entropy, JS divergence
and discriminative network approaches respectively.
.
the feature distribution G(daug) close to G(dclean), and it
is consistent with our goal discussed in Section III-B. In
the following experiment, we compare the performance
of watermark removal between our approach (adding
penalty for distribution distance based on cross-entropy
and JS divergence) and discriminative network approach.
We denote cross-entropy, JS divergence and discrimina-
tive network as CE, JS and DN respectively.
• Besides, we also compare our approach with REFIT [14],
which is the state-of-the-art watermark removal frame-
work. To ensure the consistency of the experimental
setting, we continue to use RMSProp optimizer. As
discussed before, REFIT relies on the carefully-designed
learning rate schedule, therefore, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of REFIT using different learning rates.
B. Results
The performance of watermark removal is assessed by
two metrics: test accuracy and watermark retention. On the
one hand, we observe the test accuracy on clean test set
after watermark removal, on the other hand, we measure the
TABLE I: The setting of the penalty coefficient β for different
datasets in our experiments.
Dataset
Metric
Cross-entropy JS Divergence
MNIST 0.1 1
CIFAR-10 2 10
proportion the watermarked inputs that are still misclassified
into pre-defined labels.
To illustrate that our approaches can successfully remove the
watermark while preserving the test performance on original
task, we first show the curves of watermark retention and test
accuracy in Figure 6 as an example when we only have access
to 20% of the training data. At the beginning, the watermark
retentions are almost 100%, which means that the watermarked
model memorizes the watermarks well. During the process of
the retraining for watermark removal, the watermark retentions
TABLE II: Detailed results of test accuracy and watermark retention before and after watermark removal on MNIST.
Watermark
Type
Original
Watermark Retention
Original
Test Accuracy
Percentage
of data
Test Accuracy / Watermark Retention after Watermark Removal
REFIT Ours
lr = 0.001 lr = 0.003 lr = 0.005 CE JS DN
Content-based 99.86% 98.08%
10% 97.79% / 26.33% 98.35% / 6.55% 97.68% / 3.27% 97.64% / 1.11% 97.57% / 0.92% 97.03% / 0.62%
20% 98.81% / 17.71% 98.48% / 5.46% 97.97% / 2.63% 97.74% / 0.82% 97.68% / 0.86% 97.17% / 1.16%
40% 98.87% / 7.78% 98.67% / 3.17% 98.34% / 0.31% 97.79% / 0.53% 97.75% / 0.92% 97.24% / 0.43%
Noise-based 100.00% 97.64%
10% 98.73% / 99.11% 98.14% / 98.35% 97.86% / 56.83% 97.75% / 4.17% 97.82% / 6.26% 97.44% / 0.65%
20% 98.93% / 98.98% 98.62% / 96.74% 98.39% / 48.52% 98.07% / 0.82% 98.02% / 3.43% 97.68% / 0.13%
40% 99.03% / 76.85% 98.73% / 70.33% 98.69% / 46.01% 98.14% / 2.32% 98.13% / 4.92% 97.73% / 0.17%
Unrelated 99.00% 98.53%
10% 99.03% / 89.00% 98.92% / 84.00% 98.77% / 69.00% 97.37% / 11.00% 97.17% / 15.00% 97.33% / 9.00%
20% 99.05% / 86.00% 98.89% / 79.00% 98.68% / 58.00% 97.81% / 10.00% 97.60% / 7.00% 97.56% / 14.00%
40% 99.22% / 78.00% 98.94% / 55.00% 98.85% / 35.00% 97.95% / 9.00% 97.82% / 6.00% 97.71% / 11.00%
TABLE III: Detailed results of test accuracy and watermark retention before and after watermark removal on CIFAR-10.
Watermark
Type
Original
Watermark Retention
Original
Test Accuracy
Percentage
of data
Test Accuracy / Watermark Retention after Watermark Removal
REFIT Ours
lr = 0.001 lr = 0.003 lr = 0.005 CE JS DN
Content-based 99.38% 91.31%
10% 89.27% / 1.71% 89.41% / 3.66% 88.61% / 12.74% 90.31% / 97.42% 88.71% / 47.94% 86.16% / 2.78%
20% 90.60% / 96.36% 89.11% / 37.27% 87.02% / 3.81% 89.44% / 6.64% 89.81% / 8.04% 88.69% / 8.51%
40% 90.4% / 92.68% 89.76% / 24.88% 88.57% / 1.54% 90.78% / 6.11% 90.87% / 9.23% 90.36% / 7.41%
Noise-based 100.00% 90.64%
10% 89.97% / 84.43% 88.74% / 12.98% 86.53% / 3.79% 89.10% / 1.17% 89.58% / 0.37% 88.96% / 1.42%
20% 90.39% / 82.67% 89.23% / 8.86% 87.84% / 1.86% 90.14% / 0.81% 90.46% / 1.39% 89.86% / 0.92%
40% 90.47% 87.83% 90.12% / 10.34% 88.45% / 2.41% 90.80% / 0.59% 90.62% / 0.56% 90.42% / 0.68%
Unrelated 100.00% 91.69%
10% 88.97% / 100.00% 87.72% / 68.00% 86.49% / 41.00% 87.12% / 15.00% 87.32% / 18.00% 86.60% / 22.00%
20% 89.85% / 100.00% 88.74% / 35.00% 87.53% / 22.00% 89.06% / 14.00% 88.93% / 16.00% 88.51% / 17.00%
40% 90.61% / 98.00% 89.16% / 31.00% 88.01% / 26.00% 89.55% / 17.00% 89.67% / 12.00% 88.77% / 16.00%
drop quickly and are reduced to below 10% for both content-
based and noise-based watermarks. However, it is relatively
more difficult to remove the unrelated watermarks and the
watermark retention rates remain around 20%. The main
reason is that the poisonous data used in unrelated watermark
scheme comes from totally different domains. These various
kinds of poisonous data greatly increase the difficulty of
watermark removal.
Then we present the detailed results on test accuracy and
watermark retention before and after watermark removal re-
spectively. The results on MNIST are shown in Table II. It is
obvious that CE and JS approaches have less impact on test
accuracy compared with DN approach. When we only have
10% of the training data, the test accuracy drops about 0.4%
for content-based watermarks and even slightly increases for
noise-based watermarks by use of CE and JS. The impact on
test accuracy is a little more for unrelated watermarks, with a
drop around 1.3%. In addition, unrelated watermarks are much
more difficult to remove, with higher watermark retentions
after removal compared with the others. Besides, the more
data we have access to, the higher test accuracy we get. When
using 40% of the training data, we hardly sacrifice the test
accuracy while removing the watermarks.
Also, as shown in Table II, REFIT cannot effectively re-
move the watermarks especially for noise-based and unrelated
watermarks. It heavily relies on the learning rate settings
of the optimization process, where an inappropriate learning
rate leads to either high watermark retention or low test
accuracy after fine-tuning. With the effect of EWC [15], the
test accuracy remains relatively high. However, compared to
our result, the watermark removal ability cannot be guaranteed.
In addition, we find that the watermark retention degrades
slowly comparing to our method, which might further increase
the computation power.
The detailed results on CIFAR-10 are present in Table III.
It is clear that JS has the least impact on the test accuracy
compared with the other two approaches. When we have
access to 40% of the training data, the test accuracy drops
only 0.5% for content-based watermarks and hardly drop for
noise-based scheme. Increasing the amount of available data
mitigates the impact on test accuracy, and it is more evident
in unrelated watermarks. This elaborates that as long as we
have enough data, our approach will cause little degradation
of the model performance. Similar to the results on MNIST,
removing unrelated watermarks is relatively harder, with the
watermark retention around 16%. We can see taht all three
approaches can effectively remove the watermark, however,
CE and JS perform better than DN from the perspective of
the impact on test accuracy.
Similarly, we find that REFIT [14] requires a large learning
rate to remove the watermarks. However, the increase of
learning rate could cause a decrease in test accuracy. Thus,
REFIT [14] might require some extra information of the
infused watermarks to achieve a good result in both hands.
Combining all these results, our framework can effectively
remove watermarks while preserving the performance on the
original task.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we focus on the backdoor-based watermarking
technology, which is widely applied to protect the intellectual
property of the model. We demonstrate the vulnerability of
watermarking schemes and propose our framework WILD
for watermark removal. We aim to invalidate the watermark
patterns so that the watermarked inputs can not be classified
into pre-defined label. Specifically, our framework incorpo-
rates data augmentation and the optimization of distribution
distance. In particular, our approach only requires limited
data rather than the entire training set which is practical for
adversaries in real situations. Compared with existing work,
our approach does not require a carefully-designed learning
rate schedule or additional unlabeled dataset. We evaluate
the performance of our approach against three typical types
of backdoor-based watermarks comparing to the state-of-the-
art method. The results demonstrate that our approach can
remove the watermark effectively with limited impact on the
performance of the model.
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